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Crisis Management and Economic Growth
in the Eurozone
Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji
2.1. Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2007–8 most developed countries have been
unable to return to their pre-crisis growth path. Nowhere in the developed
world is this more visible than in the Eurozone. We show this in Figure 2.1,
in which we compare the evolution of real G.D.P. in the Eurozone with real
G.D.P. in the U.S.A. and in the E.U.-countries not belonging to the Eurozone
(E.U.10). The difference is striking. Prior to the financial crisis, the Eurozone
real G.D.P. was on a slower growth path than in the U.S.A. and in E.U.10.
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the divergence has increased even further.
Real G.D.P. in the Eurozone stagnated and in 2014 was even lower than in
2008. In the U.S.A. and E.U.10 one observes (after the dip of 2009) a relatively
strong recovery. Admittedly, this recovery is below the potential growth
path of these countries (see Summers, 2014), but is much more pronounced
than in the Eurozone where stagnation prevailed. Note also that there was a
recovery in the Eurozone from 2009 to 2011, and that from 2012 to 2013 the
Eurozone experienced a double-dip recession.
What is it that makes the Eurozone such a pronounced island of stagnation
in the developed world? This is the question that we want to analyze in this
chapter.
2.2. Eurozone Stagnation: Supply or Demand Problem?
The policy response to the sovereign debt crisis has very much been influ-
enced by a supply side story of the origins of the low growth in the Eurozone.
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Figure 2.1. Real G.D.P. (prices of 2010) in Eurozone, E.U.10, and U.S.A.
Source: European Commission, Ameco database.
In this view, low growth is the result of structural rigidities, that is of a
lack of flexibility in the way the supply side of the economy works. Labour
markets are rigid, preventing demand and supply of labour from reaching
equilibrium. As a result of these rigidities, production remains below its
potential. Similarly, the goods markets are subject to price rigidities and
other imperfections that also reduce potential output. Policies that eliminate
these imperfections will increase potential output, so goes this story that has
become the mainstream view among policymakers in Europe.
Implicit in this view is that the increase in potential output will automati-
cally lead to an increase in realized output. Put differently, Say’s Law, accord-
ing to which supply creates its own demand, is implicitly assumed. Thus,
policies that improve the supply side through structural reforms will auto-
matically lead to more demand and thus to more production. The demand
side of the economy adjusts automatically to the supply side.
From Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin we have been hearing incessantly
that structural reforms are the key to economic recovery and higher growth
rates. Making labour and output markets more flexible is the only way to
boost economic growth in the Eurozone in a sustainable way, so we are
told by European policymakers. This view has been very influential and has
led countries into programmes of structural reforms of labour and product
markets.
47
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Figure 2.2. Growth G.D.P. in Eurozone (E.U.18) and E.U.10 (per cent).
Source: Eurostat.
A quick look at Figure 2.2 makes us sceptical of this view. We observe that
since 2010–11 the E.U.10 has experienced a strong recovery, whereas the
Eurozone got caught in stagnation. Prior to those years, the Eurozone and
the E.U.10 experienced similar movements of G.D.P. growth. If stagnation
in the Eurozone since the start of the sovereign debt crisis is the result of
structural rigidities, it is difficult to understand why the same structural
rigidities prevented the Eurozone from engineering an equally quick recovery
from the Great Recession of 2008–9 as the E.U.10.
All this of course is only suggestive evidence. A more systematic empirical
analysis is necessary to find out how important structural rigidities in the
labour and product markets are for economic growth. To analyze this ques-
tion we perform an econometric analysis of the factors that affect economic
growth.We will rely on the theory and the econometrics of economic growth
(see, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Acemoglu, 2009).
2.3. Structural Rigidities and Growth: An Econometric Analysis
Since Robert Solow’s seminal contribution, modern economic growth theory
has identified a number of fundamental variables that drive the economic
growth process. These variables are population growth, physical and human
capital accumulation, and technological progress (the residual in Solow’s
48
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growthmodel). Recent theoretical contributions have highlighted the impor-
tance of institutions as deep variables that influence the process of capital
accumulation and technological progress (productivity growth). Influential
contributions are Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012).
There are many institutional features that can influence the economic
growth process. The econometric literature has put a lot of emphasis on
political institutions (nature of democracy, transparency of political system,
rule of law, etc.) that affect the dynamics of physical and human capital accu-
mulation and technological progress, and through this channel economic
growth. The flexibility of labour and capital markets (or the lack thereof) is
part of the institutional characteristics of countries that can affect economic
growth. Surprisingly, relatively little importance has been given to these
features in traditional econometric analyses of econometric growth.1 In this
section we present an econometric growth model using indicators of the
degree of flexibility in labour and product markets as one of the institutions
that can facilitate capital accumulation and productivity growth.
The study is limited in that it focuses on flexibility in labour and product
markets and not the many other institutions that have been identified in
the econometric growth literature (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Acemoglu, 2009). One institutional feature we introduce
to the analysis is the quality of public governance. We use the World Bank’s
index of government effectiveness. We hope at a later stage to integrate more
institutional variables into the analysis.
Our study is limited in another sense. We restrict our econometric analysis
to O.E.C.D. countries. The main reason is that the indices of labour and
outputmarket flexibility in which we are interested have been constructed by
the O.E.C.D. for the O.E.C.D.-member countries. We are not aware of similar
indicators of labour and product market flexibility for other countries.
The econometric model is specified as follows:
yi,t = ai + βIi,t + µHi,t + θEPLi,t + λAgei,t + ρPMi,t + σGEi,t
+ γRi,t + δGi,t + εi,t
where yi,t = growth rate of per capita G.D.P. in year t in country i. This way
of defining the growth rate is equivalent to explaining the growth rate of
G.D.P. by population growth while assuming that the effect of population
growth on G.D.P. growth has a unitary elasticity; Ii,t = the ratio of investment
(private + public) to G.D.P. in year t in country i. This measures the process
1 There have been quite some empirical studies of the effect of structural reforms on eco-
nomic growth. These have mainly been performed by official institutions such as the OECD,
the European Commission and the ECB. We review these in Section 2.4.
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Figure 2.3. Employment Protection Legislation Index (mean 1998–2013).
Source: O.E.C.D. and authors’ own calculation.
of capital accumulation on economic growth; Hi,t = the proportion of the
population with a tertiary education. This variable represents human capital
accumulation. We expect it to have a positive effect on economic growth;
EPLi,t = the employment protection legislation (E.P.L.) index as measured by
the O.E.C.D. (in year t and country i). It is generally agreed that more intense
employment protection legislation makes the labour market more rigid.
Making firing more expensive also makes firms more reluctant to hire. As
a result, employment growth will be curtailed and so will economic growth.
Thus one expects a negative effect of E.P.L. on economic growth. We show
the mean E.P.L. index in the O.E.C.D. countries in Figure 2.3; Agei,t = this
is the average effective retirement age in year t in country i. According to
accepted wisdom a country that increases the retirement age of the working
population should experience more economic growth; PMi,t = the product
market regulation (P.M.R.) index as computed by the O.E.C.D. According to
conventional wisdom more product market rigidities have a negative effect
on economic growth. We show the mean P.M.R. index in the O.E.C.D. coun-
tries in Figure 2.4;GEi,t = the government effectiveness index as computed by
the World Bank. More effective government should boost economic growth.
We have added two other control variables that are often introduced in
econometric growth equations, that is the real effective exchange rate,2 Ri,t ,
2 This is measured by the effective exchange rate of country i in year t corrected for the ratio
of consumer prices in country i versus the trading partners of country i.
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Figure 2.4. Product Market Regulation Index (mean 1998–2013).
Source: O.E.C.D. and authors’ own calculation.
and government consumption as a per cent of G.D.P. The former should have
a negative effect on economic growth, that is an overvalued currency should
reduce economic growth; the latter is often assumed to have a negative effect
on G.D.P. growth. ai is the fixed country effect measuring time invariant
idiosyncrasies of countries. An important one is the initial level of per capita
income. Our empirical analysis relies on the fixed effect model.
The model was estimated for the O.E.C.D. countries. One problem we
encountered is that the sample of member-countries of the O.E.C.D. has
changed over time. Prior to 1993 the central European countries were not
members. Therefore, we estimate the model first for the smaller group of
O.E.C.D.-countries (called advanced economies) that were members prior to
1993. This estimation is over the sample period 1985–2013. Thenwe estimate
the model for the full sample of countries but over a shorter time period, that
is 1998–2013. We also estimate one specification without a dummy for the
financial crisis (starting in 2008) and one with such a dummy.
The results are presented in Table 1 (the sources of the data are presented in
Appendix 2.1). These results lend themselves to the following interpretation.
First, the investment ratio has the expected positive sign and is significant
for the O.E.C.D. countries as a whole. Second, our index of human capi-
tal (the proportion of the population with tertiary education) has a strong
and significantly positive effect on economic growth. Thus the traditional
fundamental variables of economic growth, and physical and human capital
accumulation are important in driving economic growth.
51
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The most striking aspect of our results is the finding that the structural
measures of the labour and product market rigidities do not seem to have any
influence on the growth rate of G.D.P. per capita. The O.E.C.D. employment
protection legislation index even appears to have a systematically positive
effect on growth in the full sample of the advanced economies. This is not
found in the shorter sample of all O.E.C.D.-countries, where this effect is not
significantly different from zero.
There is a possibility that labour market protection and product market
regulations affect economic growth indirectly through their effect on invest-
ment. One should not exclude the possibility that rigidities in labour and
product markets have a negative effect on investment, and through this
channel reduce economic growth. To test for this hypothesis, we regressed
investment (as a per cent of G.D.P.) on our indices of labour and product
market rigidities, together with a number of control variables. We show
the results in Appendix 2.2. It appears that we can reject the hypothesis
that labour market and product market rigidities are associated with lower
investment. In fact, in the case of labour market protection we find a positive
association, that is higher labour market protection is associated with higher
investment.
Our conclusion is that employment protection is of no visible importance
for economic growth. This may seem surprising. The Brussels–Frankfurt con-
sensus has stressed that employment protection has a negative effect on
hiring, and subsequently reduces prospects for growth. This may be true but
there is another phenomenon that may more than compensate the positive
effect of flexibility on economic growth. In economies in which employment
protection is weak, the incentives for firms to invest in its labour force are
weak. When turnover is high firms are unlikely to invest in personnel who
are likely to quit early. In addition, employees that can be fired quickly have
equally weak incentives to invest in firm-specific skills. As a result, labour
productivity is negatively affected. More generally, the quality of human
capital will be low.
One must also take into account that reverse causality may be at work,
biasing the results. This reverse causality runs as follows. In countries with
high growth, there is a high demand for labour protection. Workers and
their representatives are strong and are pushing for legislation to provide
strong employment protection. As a result, we will observe that high growth
is correlated with employment protection.
To correct for this reverse causality, we used an instrumental variable
method. We selected two instruments: the lagged E.P.L. index and the ide-
ological composition of the government along the scale right to left (for a
description, see Appendix 2.1). This takes the view that employment pro-
tection is positively correlated with the ideological composition of govern-
52
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Table 2.1. Estimation results (O.L.S.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advanced
economies
1985–2013
Advanced
economies
1985–2013
O.E.C.D.
economies
1998–2013
O.E.C.D.
economies
1998–2013
Investment/G.D.P. 0.131 0.083 0.337∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.076) (0.119) (0.120)
Proportion of tertiary education 1.739∗∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.174) (0.157) (0.174)
Real effective exchange rate −0.040∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Working population growth −0.259 −0.357 −0.640∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.335) (0.302) (0.317)
Government consumption/G.D.P. −0.870∗∗∗ −0.633∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗ −0.500∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.130) (0.155) (0.156)
Effective retirement age −0.135 0.107 −0.122 0.103
(0.152) (0.155) (0.197) (0.179)
Government effectiveness 2.002∗∗ 1.414 2.513∗∗ 1.952∗∗
(0.911) (0.984) (0.962) (0.878)
Crisis period −1.526∗∗∗ −2.142∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.391)
Employment protection 3.140∗∗∗ 2.383∗∗∗ −0.470 −0.853
(0.779) (0.748) (2.932) (2.884)
Product market protection 0.484 −0.989
(0.546) (0.605)
Observations 409 409 457 457
R-squared 0.396 0.430 0.297 0.344
Number of countries 24 24 32 32
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Advanced economy: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, South Korea, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.,
U.S.A.
Regression: fixed effect module.
ments, that is more leftist governments push for more employment protec-
tion. The results are presented in Table 2.2. We observe that the strongly
positive effect of employment protection on growth disappears. We now
find that employment protection has no significant effects on economic
growth.
The same conclusion holds for productmarket regulations. The coefficients
of this variable are never significant. Thus, product market regulations do not
seem to matter in the process of economic growth. Again this goes against
current mainstream thinking, which has been much influenced by, among
others, Aghion et al. (2001), and which stresses that the model of perfect
competition with free entry and price flexibility boosts economic growth
innovation among firms that are close to the technological frontier. There is
an older literature, however, going back to Joseph Schumpeter, stressing that
innovation, investment, and growth are better promoted in an environment
53
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Table 2.2. Estimation Results: Instrumental Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Advanced
economies
1985–2013
O.E.C.D.
economies
1998–2013
O.E.C.D.
economies
1998–2013
Advanced
economies
1998–2013
Advanced
economies
1998–2013
Second stage:
Investment G.D.P. ratio 0.111 0.270
∗∗ 0.339∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.257∗∗
(0.091) (0.129) (0.140) (0.095) (0.118)
Tertiary education/total
population
1.798∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ 1.464∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.160) (0.138) (0.147) (0.127)
Real effective exchange rate −0.041
∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
Working population growth −0.425 −0.776
∗∗∗ −0.901∗∗∗ −0.658∗∗ −0.792∗∗∗
(0.331) (0.299) (0.311) (0.274) (0.290)
Government consumption
G.D.P. ratio
−0.670∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ −0.535∗∗∗ −0.733∗∗∗ −0.666∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.180) (0.165) (0.174) (0.154)
Real retirement age 0.170 0.080 0.085 0.192 0.189
(0.148) (0.192) (0.189) (0.175) (0.173)
Government effectiveness 0.737 1.016 0.766 0.829 0.528
(1.019) (0.961) (0.932) (0.991) (0.946)
Crisis −1.595
∗∗∗ −1.771∗∗∗ −2.142∗∗∗ −1.415∗∗∗ −1.740∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.320) (0.406) (0.315) (0.378)
Employment protection 1.936
∗ −1.267 −0.784 1.101 1.608
(1.069) (2.484) (2.509) (1.066) (1.138)
Product market protection −0.775 −0.647
(0.590) (0.455)
First stage:
Excluded instruments:
Lagged employment
protection
0.877∗∗∗ 0.7893∗∗∗ 0.7728∗∗∗ 0.8660∗∗∗ 0.8365∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.0864) (0.0872) (0.0908) (0.093)
Government (left)
composition
0.0004∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0004∗ 0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Partial R-squared of excluded
instruments
0.6065 0.5387 0.5217 0.5720 0.5432
Weak Identification F test 0.0064 0.0068 0.0061 0.0064 0.0075
Hansen J statistic 0.7150 0.8469 0.8589 0.6875 0.7408
Observations 389 405 399 347 341
R-squared 0.464 0.387 0.404 0.452 0.473
Number of countries 23 28 28 23 23
Robust standard errors in parentheses, ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
of market imperfections and market power. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that both opposing views may be at work, thereby offsetting each
other.
Among our control variables, first, the effect of investment and tertiary
education are significant in most cases. Second, it appears that the real effec-
tive exchange rate matters. Countries with overvalued currencies experience
below average growth rates of G.D.P. per capita. Third, government con-
sumption (excluding investment spending or spending on social transfers for
instance) has a significant negative effect on growth. This is consistent with
the findings in the literature: government consumption not including social
54
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Table 2.3. Estimation Results (O.L.S.): Five-year Averages and Cross-section
(1) (1)
Five-year average
fixed effect model
Cross-section model
Initial G.D.P. per capita level – −0.0001
∗∗
(0.000)
Investment G.D.P. ratio 0.343
∗∗ 0.1471∗∗
(0.135) (0.068)
Tertiary education/total
population
3.639∗∗∗ 0.2345
(0.882) (0.908)
Real effective exchange rate −0.035
∗∗∗ 0.0210
(0.012) (0.019)
Working population growth −0.652 0.2870
(0.500) (0.367)
Government consumption
G.D.P. ratio
−0.410∗ −0.0770
(0.233) (0.062)
Real retirement age −0.040 −0.1159
∗∗
(0.268) (0.045)
Government effectiveness 1.663 0.1226
(1.062) (0.560)
Employment protection 0.941 −0.1032
(1.634) (0.251)
Product market protection −0.602 −0.6953
(0.570) (0.714)
Crisis −1.503
∗∗∗
(0.424)
Observations 91 32
Number of countries 32 32
R-squared 0.754 0.427
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
security spending is considered to be unproductive and thus is negatively
associated with real growth.
Finally, we also estimated themodel using five-year averages (column (1) in
Table 2.3) and a cross-section (column (2) in Table 2.3). The results in Table 3
confirm the previous results. Investments in physical and human capital are
significant driving forces of economic growth in the medium and long run.
In contrast, no significant effect can be detected of rigidities in labour and
product markets on long-term economic growth.
2.4. Survey of the Literature
Many econometric studies have been performed measuring the impact
of labour and output market rigidities on economic growth (and on
productivity growth). In general, econometric studies involving developed
countries (mainly O.E.C.D. countries) find weak and often insignificant
55
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effects of measures of rigidity on economic growth. This is especially the case
with measures of labour market regulation for which little evidence exists of
any impact on economic growth in the O.E.C.D. countries. This is confirmed
by a recent study by the I.M.F. (2015) that could not find a significant effect of
employment protection on productivity growth in a sample of industrialized
countries (see also Babecki and Campos, 2011). Older studies found mixed
evidence. Nickell and Layard (1999) found a positive association between
employment protection and productivity per capita, using cross-country
variation only. Belot et al. (2007) used a richer data-set, including time-
varying indicators of employment protection and legislation, and found that
there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between employment protection
and growth.
Whereas the previous studies looked at the macroeconomic effects of
labour market regulation on economic growth (or productivity growth),
Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009) used industry-level data to ana-
lyze the relationship between employment protection and productivity
growth. These authors found that employment protection legislations have
a depressing impact on productivity growth in industries where layoff
restrictions are more likely to be binding. It is unclear, however, how
large these sectoral effects are when we aggregate them to the economy as
a whole.
The empirical evidence of the effect of product market regulation on eco-
nomic growth confirms the theoretical uncertainty about this effect that we
noted in the Section 2.3 (see Aghion et al., 2009). Some econometric evidence
has been found that lower product market regulations increase economic
growth (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; O.E.C.D., 2015). What is striking in
these studies, however, is that these estimates are not very robust. Typically,
researchers present a large number of different specifications and definitions
and produce only a few significant results. In Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003),
out of seventeen estimated coefficients of product market regulation vari-
ables, only three are significant (see also I.M.F., 2015).
The previous studies were econometric analyses. The O.E.C.D. has per-
formed other empirical studies that simulate the effects of labour and prod-
uct market deregulations on economic growth. Two approaches have been
used: the first consists of taking some of the significant estimated coeffi-
cients of market regulation found in the literature and applying these to
many countries (see, e.g., De Mello and Padoan, 2010; Barnes et al., 2011;
Bouis and Duval, 2011). Sometimes it is not even estimated coefficients
that are used, but ‘calibrations by assumption’ (Barnes et al., 2011). This
typically produces complicated graphs showing how deregulation increases
economic growth. It should be borne inmind that these simulations use only
a small number of estimated coefficients that come from regression exercises
56
9780198785651 03-Francesco-ch02-drv Andreas (Typeset by SPi) 57 of 194 March 8, 2016 20:14
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF–FIRST PROOF,8/3/2016, SPi
Crisis Management and Economic Growth in the Eurozone
in which most estimated coefficients of market regulation variables are
insignificant.
A second approach also has been popular: this is to use a macroeconomic
model of the D.S.G.E. type and to simulate the effect of deregulation on
output (European Central Bank, 2015; Eggertsson et al., 2014; Cacciatore
et al., 2012). Invariably these simulations find that deregulation of labour and
output markets lead to increases in output.3 The problem with this approach
is that the simulations just confirm a priori beliefs. To give an example, in
most D.S.G.E. models unemployment is voluntary, that is results from a
decision of individual agents to take more leisure time. Structural reforms are
then interpreted as an intervention that changes the relative price of leisure
versus labour, that is makes the former more expensive (e.g. by reducing
unemployment benefits). As a result, agents will take less leisure time and
decide to work longer. Lo and behold, output will increase.
In addition, most D.S.G.E. models used in the simulations are based on
calibrations. They are not to be interpreted as empirical evidence. Unfortu-
nately, quite often these simulations are interpreted as providing empirical
evidence of how structural reform boosts economic growth.
A striking observation one can make is that econometric studies encom-
passing both developed and developing countries tend to find signifi-
cant effects of labour and output market regulations on economic growth.
A typical example is a study of theWorld Bank (Loayza et al., 2004). This study
finds that a deregulation of output markets in the developing countries to
the mean level achieved in the O.E.C.D. countries would increase economic
growth by up to 1.4% per year.
One may ask the question of why the econometric evidence involving
both developing and developed countries tends to be stronger than the evi-
dence about developed (O.E.C.D.) countries alone? Themain reason probably
is that the developed countries have relatively low levels of regulation of
product markets compared with developing countries. This is made clear in
Figure 2.5, which shows ameasure of product market regulation as computed
by theWorld Bank. It can be seen that within the O.E.C.D. countries the level
and the variation of product market regulation is very low compared with
that of developing countries.
This implies that once countries have reached the level of regulation
achieved in O.E.C.D. countries, few additional gains can be made in terms
of increased productivity and growth. Put differently, moving from the very
3 It should be noted that the Eggertson et al. study finds that this is the case in normal
times, but not during recessions. Structural reforms during recessions make the recession worse.
These authors conclude that during recessions and ‘in the absence of the appropriate monetary
stimulus, reforms fuel expectations of prolonged deflation, increase the real interest rate, and
depress aggregate demand’.
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Figure 2.5. Product Market Regulation.
Source: Loayza et al. (2004).
high levels of regulation observed in developing countries towards the low
levels reached in the O.E.C.D. countries produces important and significant
gains. These gains, however, tend to disappear when the levels of regulation
have reached those observed in the O.E.C.D. countries. There is then also
very little point in trying to reduce these levels even further.
2.5. Growth and Macroeconomic Imbalances
In Sections 2.1–2.4 we argued that stagnation in the G.D.P. of the Eurozone
since 2008 has little to do with structural rigidities. In other words it is mostly
unrelated to the supply side of the Eurozone countries. In this section we
argue that stagnation of the Eurozone during 2008–14 is related to asym-
metry in macroeconomic adjustment to external imbalances that has been
pursued in the Eurozone since the start of the sovereign debt crisis.
Prior to the crisis, the Southern European countries (including Ireland)
accumulated current account deficits, whereas the Northern Eurozone
countries4 built up current account surpluses. As a result, the Southern coun-
tries became the debtors and the Northern countries the creditors in the
system (see Figure 2.6). This forced the Southern countries hit by sudden
4 We define Northern Eurozone countries to be Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the
Netherlands.
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Figure 2.6. Cumulated Current Accounts.
Source: European Commission, Ameco.
liquidity stops to beg theNorthern ones for financial support. The latter reluc-
tantly did do so, but only after imposing tough austerity programmes push-
ing these countries into quick and deep spending cuts and intense recessions.
As a result, the creditor nations in the Eurozone ruled and pushed aus-
terity as the instrument to safeguard the interest of these nations. Another
approach would have been possible and could have guided the conduct of
macroeconomic policies in the Eurozone. This alternative approach is based
on the view that the responsibilities for the current account imbalances are
shared between the creditor and debtor nations. The debtor nations took on
too much debt and are responsible for that. The creditor nations extended
too much credit and are thus equally responsible for the imbalances. For
every reckless debtor there must be a reckless creditor. This symmetric view,
however, has not prevailed in relations between the creditor and debtor
nations of the Eurozone. The former have been viewed as having followed
virtuous policies and the latter as having followed foolish ones. As a result,
the debtor nations have been forced to bear the full brunt of the adjustment.
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This led to an asymmetric process where most of the adjustment has been
done by the debtor nations. In the absence of the option to devalue, the
debtor countries have been forced to reduce wages and prices relative to the
creditor countries (an ‘internal devaluation’) without compensating wage
and price increases in the creditor countries (‘internal revaluations’). This
has been achieved by intense austerity programmes in the South, whereas in
the North no compensating stimulus has been imposed.
In Figure 2.7, we show some evidence about the nature of this asymmetry.
The Figure shows the evolution of the relative unit labour costs5 of the debtor
countries (where we use the average over the 1970–2010 period as the base
period). Two features stand out. First, from 1999 until 2008–9, one observes
5 The relative unit labour cost of a country is defined as the ratio of the unit labour costs of that
country and the average unit labour costs in the rest of the Eurozone. An increase in this ratio
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a strong increase of these countries’ relative unit labour costs. Second, since
2008–9 quite dramatic turnarounds of the relative unit labour costs have
occurred (internal devaluations) in Ireland, Spain, and Greece, and to a lesser
extent in Portugal and Italy.
These internal devaluations have come at a great cost in terms of
lost output and employment in the debtor countries mainly because the
expenditure-reducing effects of these internal devaluations were more
intense than the expenditure switching (competitiveness) effects.
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Figure 2.8. Relative Unit Labour Costs in Creditor Countries Eurozone.
Source: European Commission, Ameco databank.
indicates that the country in question has seen its unit labour costs increase faster than in the
rest of the Eurozone, and vice versa. The relative unit labour costs are computed using the average
of the other Eurozone countries. The weights to compute this average, however, are specific to
each country as they depend on the shares of trade flows. For example, in the Dutch relative unit
labour cost, Germany has a share that is larger than the share of Germany in the Spanish relative
unit labour costs. Thus these indices do not have to be symmetrical.
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Is there evidence that such a process of internal revaluations has been going
on in the surplus countries? The answer is given in Figure 2.8, which presents
an evolution of the relative unit labour costs in the creditor countries. One
observes that since 2008–9 there has been very little movement in these
relative unit labour costs in these countries.
Thus, one can conclude that at the insistence of the creditor nations, the
burden of the adjustments to the imbalances in the Eurozone has been borne
almost exclusively by the debtor countries in the periphery. This has created
a deflationary bias that explains why the Eurozone has been pulled into a
double-dip recession in 2012–13, and why real G.D.P. has stagnated since
2008, in contrast with what has happened in the non-Euro E.U. countries
and in the U.S.A. It also helps to explain why the unemployment rate
increased from 8% in 2008 to close to 12% in 2014, whereas in the E.U.10
and in the U.S.A. the unemployment rate started to decline significantly
from 2010 (see Figure 2.9).
The deflationary forces to which the Eurozone was subjected as a result of
the asymmetric adjustment policies led to two other effects. The first was to
turn the current account deficit that existed in 2008 into a surplus of close
to 3% of G.D.P. in 2014 (Figure 2.10). As the debtor nations were forced into
austerity, spending declined. The latter was not offset by increased spending
in the creditor nations as these nations aimed atmaintaining current account
surpluses. Thus, the Eurozone adjustment process in all countries consisted
of saving more, pushing the current account into a significant surplus.
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Figure 2.10. Current Account Euro Area.
Source: European Commission, Ameco databank.
The second effect of the deflationary dynamics produced by an asymmetric
adjustment process was a sharp decline in inflation, which at the end of 2014
became negative in the Eurozone as a whole. We show this in Figure 2.11, in
which we compare the rate of inflation in the Eurozone and the U.S.A. It is
striking to find that while the U.S.A. seems to have stabilized its inflation
rate around a value of 1.5%, this is not the case in the Eurozone where we
observe a continuous decline of inflation since 2011, until it became negative
in December 2014.
From the preceding analysis one can conclude that all the phenomena
associated with the secular stagnation hypothesis are present in the Eurozone
in a significantly more intense manner than they are in the U.S.A. and the
other E.U. countries. Increased attempts to save, triggered by external imbal-
ances (and debt accumulation), and lack of an exchange rate instrument to
rebalance the economies of the debtor nations, drove inflation into negative
territory. This in turn prevented the real interest rate from declining further
so as to equilibrate savings and investments. As a result, the Eurozone seems
to be stuck in a low-growth. high-unemployment equilibrium.
It is interesting to make a historic parallel here. During the 1930s a number
of European countries decided to stay on gold and to keep their exchange
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Figure 2.11. Inflation in the U.S.A. and the Eurozone.
Source: ECB.
rates fixed. This forced these countries into deflationary demand policies
aimed at restoring balance of payments equilibrium. As a result, they failed
to recover and performed significantly worse than the countries that went off
gold and devalued their currencies (see Eichengreen, 1992). Something very
similar has happened in the Eurozone since the Great Recession.6
The nature of macroeconomic policies in the Eurozone is illustrated in
Figure 2.12, which shows the production possibility frontier. These poli-
cies focused on structural reform (supply side policies) aimed at shifting
the production possibility frontier of the Eurozone outward. Our empirical
analysis suggests that it is unclear whether these policies actually worked to
generate such a positive shift. At the same time the austerity policies that were
applied throughout the Eurozone reduced aggregate demand. As a result,
effective production (shown by the dot inside the production possibility
frontier) declined. The austerity policies had the effect of reducing public
investment and spending for education. As a result, the two main drivers of
economic growth, physical and human capital accumulation were affected
negatively. Thus it is more likely that the macroeconomic policies pursued in
the Eurozone had the effect of shifting the production possibilities frontier
6 See also Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009).
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?
Figure 2.12. Production Possibility Frontier.
downwards, together with a decline in effective production (see Blanchard
and Leigh, 2013).
2.6. What Should Be Done?
All this leads to the question of what to do today, in 2016? As stressed by
many participants in the debate concerning secular stagnation (see Teulings
and Baldwin, 2014; Summers, 2014), the policy mix to lift countries from the
low growth and high unemployment equilibrium is a mix of monetary and
fiscal expansion.
The E.C.B. decided to do its part, albeit rather late, when it decided to start
its Q.E. programme in January 2015. Although this programme looks quite
spectacular, it should not be forgotten that the E.C.B. will be restoring the
money base to its pre-crisis growth path. This is made clear in Figure 2.13,
which contrasts the balance sheets of the E.C.B. with those of the U.S. Fed.
The contrast since 2012 is spectacular. To stimulate the U.S. economy, the
Fed engaged in a dramatic increase of its balance sheet. During the same
time, when the Eurozone turned back in a double-dip recession, the E.C.B.
allowed its balance sheet to contract by €1 trillion. Quite a surprising policy
choice. The announced Q.E. programme of €1 trillion will bring the money
base back on track, not more than that.
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Figure 2.13. Balance Sheet Fed and E.C.B. (2004–14).
Source: E.C.B. and Federal Reserve.
It is now generally recognized that when the economy is in a liquidity trap,
monetary policy is insufficient to stimulate aggregate demand, and that fiscal
policies have to take the brunt of demand stimulus.
Governments of the Eurozone, in particular in the Northern member
countries now face historically low long-term interest rates. The German
government, for example, can borrow at less than 1% at a maturity of ten
years. These historically low interest rates create a window of opportunities
for these governments to start a major investment programme. Money can
be borrowed almost for free, while in all these countries there are great needs
to invest in the energy sector, the public transportation systems, and the
environment.
This is therefore the time to reverse the ill-advised decisions made since
2010 to reduce public investments, as illustrated in Figure 2.14. This can be
done at very little cost. The country that should lead this public investment
programme is Germany. There are two reasons for this. First, as we argued ear-
lier, the asymmetric nature of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes
within the Eurozone unnecessarily magnified the cost of these programmes
in the debtor nations, and is responsible for the stagnation of the Eurozone
since 2008. Second, public investments as a per cent of G.D.P. in Germany
are among the lowest of all Eurozone countries. In 2013 public investment
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Figure 2.14. Public Investment in the Eurozone.
Source: Eurostat.
in German amounted to a bare 1.6% of G.D.P. versus 2.3% in the rest of the
Eurozone (see also Fratzscher, 2014, on this).
Such a public investment programme would do two things. First, it would
stimulate aggregate demand in the short run and help to pull the Eurozone
out of its stagnation. Second, in the long run it would help to lift the long-
term growth potential in the Eurozone.
The prevailing view in many countries is that governments should not
increase their debt levels lest they put a burden on future generations. The
truth is that future generations inherit not only the liabilities but also the
assets that have been created by the government. Future generations will not
understand why these governments did not invest in productive assets that
improve these generations’ welfare, while present-day governments could do
so at historically low financing costs.
There is a second factor that prevents European policymakers from using
a large government investment programme to lift the Eurozone from its
stagnation. These policymakers continue to believe that the stagnation since
2008 is a result of structural rigidities in the Eurozone. Thus the problem of
stagnation is seen as originating exclusively from the supply side. In this view
structural reforms (together with austerity) are the answer.
We have shown evidence that structural rigidities in the labour and product
markets have insignificant effect on economic growth. As a result these
rigidities cannot be seen as the primary cause of the Eurozone stagnation
since 2008. It is time policymakers face this truth and start following policies
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that work. This will have to come mainly from fiscal programmes aimed at
boosting investment.
2.7. Conclusion
Macroeconomic policies pursued since the financial crisis in the Eurozone
have not been evidence-based. Supply side policies (‘structural reforms’) have
been at the centre of policy-thinking in the Eurozone and member countries
have been forced to implement such supply side policies. In this chapter, we
have provided evidence against the view that supply side policies boost eco-
nomic growth. In some cases the evidence even suggests that these policies
might reduce economic growth. This is particularly the case with the forced
breakdown of employment protection, which is likely to reduce investment
in human capital.
Thus it appears that macroeconomic policies rather than being evidence-
based have been ideology-based. This ideology claims that flexibility in
labour and product markets should be pursued under all circumstances. The
evidence that this will lead to more growth is extremely thin.
In contrast, the strong empirical evidence that investment in physical and
human capital is key to economic growth has not been used. On the contrary,
in the name of austerity and a phobia vis-à-vis government debt, a decline in
public investment was set in motion endangering the long-term potential of
the Eurozone. In addition, austerity had the effect of reducing spending for
education, thereby reducing the potential for long-term economic growth.
The discussion in this chapter does not imply that no structural reforms
are necessary. Some are, even if their implications for economic growth
are uncertain. The main structural reform in the labour market consists of
eliminating its dual nature. This has been a serious problem in countries
like Italy and Spain, in which older workers are fully protected and the
newcomers, the young, are not. As a result, the latter face extremely flexible
labour contrasts with little protection. This duality in labour contracts has
the effect of reducing human capital of the young as both the firms and the
young have little incentives to invest in better skills. In addition, this duality
leads to important negative social and political effects as a new generation
feels it is not really integrated in society. Some steps have been taken in a
number of countries (Italy, Spain) with new legislation that promises to do
away with this duality. This is done by introducing a unified labour contract
for young and old, whereby employment protection is gradually built up for
the young that enter the labour market (see Boeri et al., 2013).
The crisis management that was set up in the Eurozone after the eruption
of the government debt crisis can be said to be responsible for the economic
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stagnation experienced by the Eurozone. This crisis management was char-
acterized by two features. One was the asymmetric adjustment to the current
account imbalances that forced the deficit countries into intense austerity
without a compensating policy of stimulus in the surplus countries. This led
to a deflationary bias that created strong collateral damage on investment,
both private and public.
The second feature of crisis management was its focus on supply poli-
cies. While the overriding macroeconomic problem was an insufficiency of
demand, policymakers insisted on fixing the supply side of the economy in
the hope that this would spur long-term economic growth. The evidence
we have provided in this chapter is that these supply side policies have
insignificant, and sometimes even negative effects on long-term economic
growth. As a result, together with the negative effects of austerity on invest-
ment, it can be concluded that the crisis management in the Eurozone not
only exacerbated a demand problem, but also harmed the long-term growth
potential of the Eurozone.
Appendix 2.1 Description of the Variables
Variable Sources Note
Real growth rate O.E.C.D.
Investment/ G.D.P. World Bank
W.D.I.
Real effective
exchange rate
O.E.C.D. Measures the competitiveness-weighted relative
consumer prices and unit labour costs for a
country
Working population
growth
O.E.C.D.
Government con-
sumption/G.D.P.
Oxford
Economics
Value of government spending on goods and ser-
vices expressed as a share of nominal G.D.P.
This includes things like the public sector’s pay-
roll and procurement. It does not include invest-
ment spending or spending on social transfers for
instance
Effective retirement
age
O.E.C.D.
Government
effectiveness
Worldwide
governance
indicator
Proportion of tertiary
education
World Bank
education
I.I.A.S.A./V.I.D.
Projection
Proportion of population by educational attain-
ment, age 15–64, total, tertiary
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Variable Sources Note
Employment
protection
legislation (E.P.L.)
O.E.C.D. Strictness of employment protection–individual and collec-
tive dismissals (regular contracts)
Product market
protection index
O.E.C.D. A comprehensive and internationally comparable set of indi-
cators that measure the degree to which policies promote
or inhibit competition in areas of the product market where
competition is viable. They measure the economy-wide
regulatory and market environments. The indicators cover
formal regulations in the following areas: state control
of business enterprises; legal and administrative barriers
to entrepreneurship; barriers to international trade and
investment
Government cabinet
composition
(left) %
Comparative
political data
Government composition: cabinet posts of social democratic
and other left parties as a percentage of total cabinet posts.
Weighted by the number of days in office in a given year
Appendix 2.2 Investment G.D.P. Ratio Regression (fixed effects
model)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advanced
economies
1985–2013
O.E.C.D.
economies
1998–2013
Advanced
economies
1998–2013
Advanced
economies
1998–2013
Growth 0.087 0.137
∗∗∗ 0.107∗ 0.106∗
(0.063) (0.045) (0.052) (0.054)
Real effective exchange rate 0.028 0.041
∗∗∗ 0.032 0.047∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016)
Working population growth 2.330
∗∗∗ 2.072∗∗∗ 2.405∗∗∗ 2.269∗∗∗
(0.532) (0.486) (0.551) (0.515)
Government consumption
G.D.P. ratio
−0.235 −0.212∗ −0.187 −0.167
(0.175) (0.123) (0.168) (0.162)
Real retirement age 0.211 0.193 0.153 0.227
(0.178) (0.193) (0.175) (0.168)
Government effectiveness −0.152 0.417 −0.178 −0.039
(1.083) (0.936) (1.061) (0.951)
Tertiary education/total
population
−0.415∗ −0.244∗ −0.242 −0.166
(0.206) (0.129) (0.162) (0.144)
Employment protection 5.707
∗∗∗ 4.220∗∗∗ 5.952∗∗∗ 4.382∗∗∗
(1.312) (1.187) (1.369) (1.342)
Product market protection 0.734 1.109
(0.582) (0.719)
Observations 409 457 365 359
R-squared 0.543 0.525 0.579 0.611
Number of iid 24 32 24 24
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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